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When skilled workers are employed in both regions, we know from Krugman (1991b) that
regional real wages of skilled workers are equal at the long run equilibrium:
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Moreover, the full employment of skilled workers requires that:
H¯ = Hn +Hs (19)
Total wages of skilled workers in region r are equal to the share of total production costs of the
region:
Hrwhr = γTCmirnr (20)
Finally, by equating total unskilled workers’ demand from the agricultural and the manufacturing
sector to their regional supply, we obtain the market clearing condition for unskilled workers in
region r:
wlrL¯ = (1− γ − µ)TCmirnr + (1− µc)λr(whrHr + wlrL¯+ nrπir) (21)
+(1− µc) (1− λv)(whvHv + wlvL¯+ nvπiv)
where λr and λv are, respectively, the shares of agricultural expenditure devoted to domestic
production by residents in region r and v, with r 6= v.
3 Technological evolution
In this paper we want to investigate what the interregional distribution of the economic activity
becomes if interregional knowledge spill-overs take place only when the initial technological gap
is not too wide, and when trade costs, taken as a proxy for the obstacles to interaction between
firms of diﬀerent regions, are suﬃciently low. Therefore, the critical force lies in the ability of
firms located in the receiving regions to use the flow of additional knowledge.
In fact, Verspagen (1991, p. 362-363) points out that the learning abilities of a lagging region or
country “depend both on an intrinsic capability, and on its technological distance from the leading
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country”. Furthermore, he maintains that the intrinsic learning capability “is determined by a
mixture of social factors (Abramovitz, 1986), education of the workforce (Baumol et al., 1989),
the level of the infrastructure, the level of capitalization (mechanization) of the economy, the
correspondence of the sectorial mix of production in the leading and following country (Pasinetti,
1981), and other factors.”
However, we argue that learning through knowledge spill-overs processes is also enhanced
when firms in the less developed regions have more opportunities to observe and learn how all
the diﬀerent phases of production are conducted by firms active in the more developed regions.
We believe that such an observation is more likely to occur when the level of integration is higher
because natural and artificial barriers to trade are lower. Thus, the productivity of firms producing
in a less developed region may be increased through a process of learning by interacting with
firms that produce in the more developed region. Since knowledge spill-overs do not take place
automatically, we find it reasonable to assume that their chances to occur increase when trade costs
are “small”, while knowledge spill-overs fail to take place when trade costs are “high”. Therefore,
low trade costs act as a stabilizing force because they favor knowledge spill-overs.3
In fact, recent empirical works, such as that by Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (2001a,b),
illustrate the importance of trade as a mechanism of international knowledge spill-overs.4
Particularly, Keller (2001a, p. 5) finds that, for manufacturing industries in the world’s seven
major industrialized countries during the years between 1970 and 1995, “the scope for knowledge
spillovers is severely limited by distance”. Furthermore, Keller finds (2001a, p. 1) that “trade
patterns account for the majority of all diﬀerences in bilateral spillover flows, whereas foreign
3 Also Baldwin and Forslid (2000) consider knowledge spill-overs as a stabilizing force, but they assume that
their size can be determined by policy makers. In particular, they assume that knowledge spill-overs increase when
integration takes place through a lowering of the cost of trading information, and that knowledge spill-overs are
independent from trade costs viewed as the cost of trading goods. Hence, while in our model, high trade costs
entail null knowledge spill-overs, and in this case act as a destabilizing force, Baldwin and Forslid show that high
knowledge spill-overs may stabilize the symmetric equilibrium even if trade costs are high.
4 The theoretical models on which are built these empirical works are the innovation-driven growth models by
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Moreover, Keller (2001a) refers also
to the New Economic Geography contributions by Krugman (1991a,b) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
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direct investments and communications flow diﬀerences account for circa 15% each”, and that
“these three channels together account for almost the entire localization eﬀect that would be
otherwise attributed to geographic distance”.
In order to illustrate the fact that trade acts as a channel through which knowledge spill-
overs take place, we assume that learning capabilities ψ depend upon trade costs. Specifically, we
assume that when trade costs are above a certain threshold value τ¯ , firms in the lagging region
are unable to assimilate any of the potential knowledge spill-overs from the leading region, so that
the actual learning capabilities ψ of this region are equal to zero. However, when trade costs are
below τ¯ , the region’s learning capabilities rise as trade costs fall. This leads us to assume that
ψ(τ) =



c(τ¯ − τ) if τ 0 τ¯
0 if τ > τ¯
(22)
where c > 0 is a parameter that represents the influence on learning abilities of all other above-
mentioned factors. For simplicity, we assume that there are no interregional diﬀerences in these
other factors so that c is the same across regions.
In order to describe how the learning ability aﬀects the production activity in the lagging
regions, we assume that the technological level depends on the learning capabilities and on the
technological gap between the two regions through the following dynamic equation:
a˙s =
h
(as − 1)3 + ψ (1− as)
i
(23)
where as ≥ 0.
This specification describes the fact that the technological advantage of a region tends to
increase over time - following cumulative processes, that we consider exogenous in this paper -
unless the technological gap between the two regions can be closed thanks to interregional learning
capabilities, represented by positive values of ψ.5 Furthermore, equation (23) takes into account
the fact that when learning capabilities are small, even though they are positive, firms in the
5 See Dosi (1988), for instance, that maintains that the technological advantage of a region tends to increase
along a technological trajectory because leading regions tend to growth faster.
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lagging region may recover their technological lag only when it is not too wide. In fact, when
the technological gap is very wide, the amount of knowledge spill-overs required by firms in the
lagging region to catch up is very wide. And if this is not the case, because trade costs are high,
the lagging region will definitively fall behind.
For the given normalization (7), the north (south) is the technological leader, while the south
(north) is the lagging region, when as < 1 (as > 1).
Three equilibrium values for as, when ψ > 0, are:
as = 1 as = 1−
p
ψ as = 1 +
p
ψ
Thus, one of the possible equilibria for equation (23) is given by the symmetric equilibrium, which
is characterized by identical regional levels of technology (as = an = 1).6 In Figure 1, we plot
equation (23) when ψ = 0.5.
The intercept of the function (23) with the vertical axis is given by ψ − 1. Therefore, we may
observe that as = 0 is a stable equilibrium with no firm producing the modern good in the south
if learning capabilities of this region are very low (ψ < 1). In this case, for a given value of c, trade
costs are too high (τ > τ¯ − 1/c) to allow firms in the south to assimilate technology spill-overs
from the north. When this is so, the technological advantage of the north continuously increases
over time.
The “symmetric” equilibrium characterized by as = an = 1 is stable if the slope of (23) is
negative in a neighborhood of this point, that is, if ψ > 0. In this case, trade costs are low enough
(τ < τ¯) to allow firms in the receiving regions to assimilate technology spill-overs.
Insert Figure 1 about here
When we consider only the dynamic equation (23), the symmetric equilibrium is stable only
if learning abilities in both regions are positive, that is, if ψ > 0. Moreover, when learning
6 Equilibrium values can also be considered as steady state equilibrium values with positive and equal, exogenous
growth rate of the technological level. In fact, function (23) expresses relative technological development since the
normalization an = 1 has been adopted.
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capabilities are high enough, namely when ψ > 1, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for any
initial value of as < 1. Figure 2 shows this case when ψ = 1.5.
Insert Figure 2 about here
However, when learning abilities are positive but not too high because trade costs are not low
enough, the lagging region may benefit from interregional knowledge spill-overs provided that its
technological lag is not too wide. In fact, when the lagging region is the south (as < 1), firms in
this region may benefit from knowledge spill-overs only when the level of the technology of this
region is not too low, namely as > 1−
√
ψ. In other words, firms in the south may recover their lag
only if the technological gap (1−as) from the leading region is smaller than
√
ψ. On the contrary,
when the technological leading region is the south (as > 1), firms in the northern region may
recover their lag, thanks to knowledge spill-overs from the south, only when the technological lag
is not too wide for the given learning abilities, that is, if as − 1 <
√
ψ. This two conditions taken
together entail that the symmetric equilibrium as = an = 1 is a stable equilibrium for expression
(23), when ψ > 0, only if for a given initial value of the technology level, a0s, we have that:
1−
p
ψ < a0s <
p
ψ + 1
The width of the recoverable lag increases (decreases) when learning capabilities increase (de-
crease), namely when the economic integration between the two regions becomes higher (lower).
In short, when the south is the lagging region (as < 1), the following three cases may occur for
respectively high, low or intermediate trade costs.
Case 1 τ > τ¯ . When trade costs are too high, the symmetric equilibrium can never be reached
because firms in the lagging region cannot benefit from technology spill-overs from the leading
region, given the low level of integration.
Case 2 τ < τ¯ −1/c. When trade costs are low, firms in the lagging region can successfully exploit
potential technology spill-overs from the leading region and the symmetric equilibrium is stable.
Case 3 τ¯ − 1/c < τ < τ¯ . For intermediate trade costs the process of catching up of the lagging
region with the leading region may be completed because trade is suﬃciently developed to allow firms
in the lagging region to interact with the most productive firms in the leading region. However,
this happens only when the technological gap between the two regions is not too wide for the given
learning abilities. In other words, when: 1− a0s <
√
ψ.
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